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The article explores the use of comparative surveys in judgments of the European Court of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) as an international 
judicial institution is predetermined by the necessity to seek precise and consistent reasoning 
for particular outcomes in individual cases. However, the norms of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) are frequently abstract and far from being straightforward. When 
the wording of the ECHR is not precise enough the Court has to look for additional sources 
such as the laws of the Contracting Parties,1 relevant international treaties,2 internal 
developments within the respondent State3 as well as other sources. The Court has deployed 
these sources to clarify the meaning of the ECHR and the Protocols which are the only ones 
legally binding and support a particular outcome of a case and, therefore, such sources serve 
a persuasive purpose emphasizing particular interpretations.  
This paper argues that alongside the classical distinction between binding and persuasive 
legal sources the Court uses comparative data, prepared in its comparative law report, for an 
informational purpose. A comparative law report does not advocate a particular approach but 
rather presents a spectrum of possible outcomes of a particular issue.4 Such reports inform 
the Court about the context in which a particular legal phenomenon operates in different 
European countries. 
One can suggest that if a comparative survey reveals a trend in Europe then such a survey is 
more likely to be used for a persuasive purpose. However, deployment of comparative law 
for a persuasive purpose is not clearly dependent on whether the comparative survey reveals a 
common European trend in relation to a particular legal issue. Sometimes, a lack of 
                                                          
1 See, ECtHR Taxquet v. Belgium, 16 November 2010 (Appl.no. 926/05). 
 
2 See, ECtHR M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011 (Appl.no. 30696/09); ECtHR Neulinger and 
Shuruk v. Switzerland, 6 July 2010 (Appl.no 41615/07). 
 
3 See, ECtHR Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1981 (Appl.no. 7525/76) discussing the reform of 
the criminal legislation concerning homosexuality and application of these laws in practice. 
 
4 Judge Garlicki maintained that comparative analysis can inform the Court about possible solutions to a 
particular legal issue. Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Lech Garlicki (European Court of 
Human Rights, Strasbourg 2009). For the purposes of this paper thirteen judges of the European Court of 
Human Rights were interviewed by the first mentioned author in Strasbourg and Florence in 2008-2010. All 
interviews were digitally recorded and scripted. For the summary of some interviews see Dzehtsiarou, K., 
‘Consensus from within the Palace Walls’ (September 17, 2010). UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & 
Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No.40/2010. Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678424. 
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consensus can justify the Court’s reluctance to intervene and therefore supports a broader 
margin of appreciation.5  
Currently, comparative law reports are prepared for almost all Grand Chamber cases6 as well 
as for some cases dealt with by the Chambers. Research is carried out upon a request from the 
Judge-Rapporteur7 by the Research Division of the Court, which operates within the Court’s 
Registry. The Judge-Rapporteur frames the questions and the questions are then forwarded 
by the Research Division to national lawyers working at the Court, who each prepare a report 
summarising the law and practice in their respective countries. Each national report is then 
signed by the  judge of the ECtHR elected in respect of the country concerned. Afterwards, 
the national reports are compiled by the Research Division in a composite report which is 
then sent to the Judge-Rapporteur and other judges of the Chamber or Grand Chamber 
respectively. These reports are confidential and not accessible to the general public. 
Ultimately, the Court decides what weight it will attach to the comparative analysis in a 
particular case. Even if the report is not cited in the final judgment or the comparative data 
does not form a part of a justificatory argument, it can provide the Court with useful 
information. An informed decision bolsters the substantive legitimacy of ECtHR judgments. 
In accordance with Richard Fallon’s work, substantive legitimacy is understood here as the 
stakeholders’ perception of a decision as substantively correct and encompassing all relevant 
points of dispute.8 Substantive legitimacy may be contrasted with process legitimacy, which 
is concerned with adherence to established decision-making procedure.9 Comparative data is 
a useful source of relevant information even if it is not integrated into a persuasive argument 
by the ECtHR since it increases the Court’s awareness of relevant approaches taken in the 
                                                          
5 See, for example ECtHR Lautsi and others v. Italy, 18 March 2011 (Appl.no. 30814/06), at para. 70. 
 
6 Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Ján Šikuta (European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg 
2010). 
 
7 A Judge-Rapporteur is a judge appointed by the Section President according with Rule 49 which provides that 
where an application is made under Article 34 of the Convention and its examination by a Chamber or a 
Committee seems justified, the President of the Section to which the case has been assigned shall designate a 
judge as Judge-Rapporteur, who shall examine the application.  
 
8  Fallon, R.H., Jr., 'Legitimacy and the Constitution', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1787–
1853. 
 
9 See, Franck, T.M., 'Why a Quest for Legitimacy',  UC Davis Law  Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, pp. 535-548, 
at p. 543; Hershovitz, S., 'Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority', Legal Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003, 
pp. 201-220; Dzehtsiarou, K., 'Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of 
the European Court of Human Rights', Public Law, No. 3, 2011, 534-553, at p. 535. 
 
Contracting Parties and hence increases the substantive legitimacy of the judgments. The fact 
that comparative law is not explicitly deployed as a part of a persuasive argument does not 
seem to negate its legitimising potential. It is argued that if the Court articulates its awareness 
of the various approaches adopted by the Contracting Parties it confirms that the ECtHR has 
searched for the most optimal solution in the case.  
The first section of the paper examines the substantive legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments. 
The second section of the paper establishes a framework for distinguishing between 
comparative data used for persuasive and informational purposes.  It is argued that a 
comparative report is solely a source of information if it has not been used in the reasoning as 
part of a compelling argument.10 Finally, having established that comparative data can 
increase the substantive legitimacy of the Court’s judgments this article argues that the Court 
should take care to avoid common pitfalls in comparative research. The judges of the ECtHR 
can rely on comparative analysis only if it is methodologically adequate and represents the 
current state of the law in the Contracting Parties and occasionally in jurisdictions outside of 
Europe. In this way, the positive influence of comparative research on legitimacy, what is 
discussed in the first part of the paper, can be ensured. The relative advantages of various 
institutions capable of doing such research are also considered. 
2. LEGITIMACY OF THE JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The judgments of the ECtHR should be legitimate in order to ensure State compliance,11 and 
the legitimacy of the ECtHR is based on the consent of the States that agreed to be 
supervised.12 However, it seems farfetched to suggest that the Contracting Parties a prioiri 
                                                          
10 The interviewed judges of the ECtHR mentioned that they use comparative analysis as a source of 
background information and of alternative solutions to a certain legal problem. Lech Garlicki mentioned that he 
was a Judge-Rapporteur in Demir and Baykara v. Turkey. He pointed out that ‘we decided that we would like to 
have this information [comparative research]. And it also was partly because collective labour law is not my 
field and I wanted to be better informed’.  Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Lech Garlicki.  
Judge Šikuta pointed out that ‘a comparative report or study is a source of information. The more information 
the judge has the better it is. He/she can take more issues into account, can evaluate them, can make balancing 
exercise. Better and more informed decision will be delivered’. Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the 
ECtHR Ján Šikuta. 
 
11 Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit note 9, p. 535. 
 
12 In classical international law the jurisdiction of international organisations was entirely dependent on the 
consent of the Member States, and while it plays a less important role in contemporary international law theory 
it still possesses a legitimising potential. Kumm, M., 'The legitimacy of international law: a constitutionalist 
framework of analysis' European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 5, 2004, pp. 907-931, at p. 914; 
O'Rahilly, A., 'The Sovereignty of the People' (1921) 37 Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 37, 1921, pp. 
39-56, at p. 49; Krisch, N., Beyond Constitutionalism, The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 13; Buchanan A., 'The Legitimacy of International Law', in: Besson, S. and 
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accept any ruling of the Court.13 One can argue that the Contracting Parties agree to be ruled 
by the ECtHR by virtue of ratification of the ECHR giving their original consent, which is, 
however, not all embracive.14 If the Court relies entirely on original consent, the States can 
rationally disagree and claim that the matter at issue was not anticipated at the time of 
ratification.15 Moreover, the reliance on original consent makes the Court’s competence to 
deploy dynamic interpretation questionable. Therefore, each judgment should possess 
qualities that can confirm substantive legitimacy reaching the level of a convincing judgment 
delivered by an authoritative and well informed institution. 
The legitimacy of judicial review is the subject of fierce academic debate, particularly in 
systems influenced by the American model of judicial review.16 However, unlike the US 
Supreme Court, the ECtHR conducts a review in which a legal act incompatible with the 
ECHR is not struck down but the national authorities are requested to revise this act. While 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Tasioulas, J. (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 79-118, at 
p. 90. 
 
13 Rozakis, C., 'The European Judge as Comparatist', Tulane Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2005, pp. 257-279, at 
p. 258, Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit note 9, at p. 537. 
 
1414 Lord Hoffmann argues that ‘[w]hen we [the United Kingdom] joined, indeed, took the lead in the 
negotiation of the European Convention, it was not because we thought it would affect our own law, but because 
we thought it right to set an example for others and to help to ensure that all the Member States respected those 
basic human rights which were not culturally determined but reflected our common humanity’. Hoffmann, L., 
'Human Rights and the House of Lords', Modern Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1999, pp. 159-166, at p. 159.  
Buchanan maintains that ‘[e]ven though... [international] institutions are created by State consent and cannot 
function without State support, they engage in ongoing governance activities, including the generation of laws 
and/or law like rules that are not controlled by the ‘specific consent’ of States’. Buchanan, op.cit note 12, at p. 
91. 
 
15 Lord Hoffmann points out that ‘[t]he proposition that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ is the banner 
under which the Strasbourg Court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be required by 
‘European public order’. I would entirely accept that the practical expression of concepts employed in a treaty or 
constitutional document may change. To take a common example, the practical application of the concept of a 
cruel punishment may not be the same today as it was even 50 years ago. But that does not entitle a judicial 
body to introduce wholly new concepts, such as the protection of the environment, into an international treaty 
which makes no mention of them, simply because it would be more in accordance with the spirit of the times.’ 
Hoffmann, L., 'The Universality of Human Rights', Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 125, No. 3, pp. 416-432, at p. 
428. 
 
16 The American model is a system of a strong judicial review where  a court has a competence to struck down a 
piece of legislation this court deems unconstitutional. Friedman, B., 'The Counter-majoritarian Problem and the 
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship', Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2001, pp. 933-
954, at pp. 932-945. Constitutional scholarship has been so intensely fixated on the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty, that the paradigm has been alternately referred to as an “obsession,” a “preoccupation,” and even a 
“platitude, by others within the academia. Martens, A.M., 'Reconsidering Judicial Supremacy: From the 
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty to Constitutional Transformations' Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, 
pp. 447-459, at p. 448. See also Masterman, R., The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 39. 
 
this form of review seems to be less controversial for an international institution,17 the 
national authorities need to perceive the judgments as legitimate and persuasive in order to 
amend the national legislation or practice as required by the ECtHR.  
There is no commonly accepted theory of legitimacy and commentators usually are divided 
into two main schools of thought: process legitimacy and substantive legitimacy.18 Some 
theorists have integrated these two models into hybrid legitimacy. Process theorists such as 
Waldron,19 Dahl,20 Weber,21 and Kelsen22 define legitimacy as an attribute which a norm, 
decision, or institution possesses only if it was adopted or created in accordance with 
accepted procedure. Process legitimacy of judicial decision-making is associated with such 
factors as transparency,23 coherency, consistency, and predictability of reasoning.24 
In contrast with process theorists, substantive legitimacy theorists insist that the content of a 
ruling must be taken into account in assessing its legitimacy.25 Waldron assessed substantive 
                                                          
17 See, Waldron, J., 'The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review', Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, 2006, pp. 
1346-1406. 
 
18 Franck distinguished process, substantive and outcome legitimacy. Franck, loc.cit note 9, at 543. Some 
commentators categorise legitimacy into input and output legitimacy. Scharpf, F.W., 'Problem-Solving 
Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU', MPIfG Working Paper, Vol. 3, 2003. 
 
19 Waldron argues that judicial review is illegitimate since it is conducted by unelected judges who do not have 
popular mandate. See, Waldron, loc.cit note 17. Waldron considers substantive reasons for legitimacy as well, 
but these reasons play an auxiliary role in his argument. His primary concern is lack of democratic mandate on 
the side of judiciary. Waldron, loc.cit note 17, at pp. 1371-1372. 
 
20 Dahl argued that ‘even the best-designed judicial system can guarantee only procedural justice; it cannot 
guarantee substantive justice. A constitution can ensure a right to a fair trial; it cannot absolutely guarantee that 
a fair trial will always lead to the right verdict. But it is precisely because no such guarantee is possible that we 
place such a high value on a fair trial’. Dahl, R.A., Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, New 
Haven/London, 1989, p. 169. 
 
21 Weber, M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Mohr, Tübingen, 1972, p. 19. 
 
22 Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law, University of California Press, Berkeley/London, 1989, p. 198. 
 
23 Kumm, loc.cit note 12, at p. 926. 
 
24 It was argued that at very least it is not fair to the losing party not to be aware of the applicable standards in 
advance. King, J.A., 'Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, 2008, pp. 409-441, at p. 412 Buchanan argues that an enforcement mechanism can be legitimate if the 
rules are reasonably clear and legal consequences are predictable. Buchanan, A., 'Human Rights and the 
Legitimacy of the International Order', Legal Theory, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2008, pp. 39-70, at p.  41 
 
25 Raz has constructed a so called ‘normal justification thesis’.  He argues that authority should be obeyed if it 
can be shown that ‘the alleged subject is likely better to comply with the reasons which apply to him (other than 
the alleged authoritative directive) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding 
and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.’ Raz, J., The 
Morality of Freedom, Clarendon, Oxford, 1988, at p. 53. If Razian theory is correct then legitimacy of the order 
is dependent on the content of the order rather than on the process through which it was adopted. 
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legitimacy through outcome-related reasons. He argued that ‘outcome-related reasons are 
reasons for designing the decision-procedure in a way that will ensure the appropriate 
outcome (i.e., a good, just, or right decision)’.26 According to Waldron, rational disagreement 
is possible in assessment of judgments, namely some people can think that they are just, right 
or good while the others can rationally disagree.27 This article argues that while disagreement 
about these categories is possible, the Court is likely to produce a “good, just, or right 
decision” if all relevant information is duly taken into account. Information about legal 
regulation of a matter in European and non-European countries other than the respondent 
State or States is a valuable source of information for the Court. French points out:  
[I]nterpreting a treaty through reference to other law permits a tribunal to ensure 
that the narrow application of a rule is not allowed to overrule broader notions of 
justice. By referring to other rules of law, a tribunal can seek to provide for a more 
just answer than one that a restricted interpretation might otherwise give.28 
Decision-making informed by comparative law is not a panacea against “bad” decisions; 
“wrong”, “unfair”, “biased” choices are still possible. However, it seems commonplace to say 
that an informed decision-maker is less likely to make a “bad” decision.29 Moreover, and not 
less important for legitimacy, an informed decision seems to present itself as more fair and 
better. Therefore, decision-making explicitly informed by comparative law increases the 
substantive legitimacy of the judgments produced by the ECtHR.30 
                                                          
26 Waldron, loc.cit note 17, at p. 1373. 
 
27 Waldron, J., 'Moral Truth and Judicial Review', American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 43, 1998, pp. 75-97, 
at p. 77. 
 
28 French, D., 'Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules', International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2006, pp. 281-314, at p. 286. 
 
29 See, Murray, P., Poole, D. and Jones, G., Contemporary issues in management and organisational behavior, 
Thomson Learning, Southbank, 2006, pp. 154-155. 
 
30 Research conducted by Başak Çalı, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch was aimed to trace how legitimacy of the 
ECtHR is perceived by the stakeholders: lawyers, politicians, and judges from five Member States: Bulgaria, 
Germany, Ireland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 20% of respondents made a reference to knowledge of 
domestic facts and law as an issue increasing legitimacy. This result was higher than for such criteria as ‘judicial 
independence’, ‘case law coherence’, and ‘enforcement’. However, it is lower than such criteria as ‘length of 
proceeding’ and ‘qualification and experience of the judges’. Çalı, B., Koch, A. and Bruch, N., 'The Legitimacy 
of the European Court of Human Rights: The View from the Ground', 2011, p. 13. Decision-making by 
informed judges is therefore considered by the stakeholders as relevant consideration for legitimacy of the 
judgments. 
 
In the context of the ECtHR, information acquires even greater legitimising potential than on 
the national level. The ECtHR’s judges, with the exception of a national judge in a specific 
case, are less familiar with the legal and social context of the specific respondent State. The 
Court is further remote from the matter at issue. This article argues that, if summarised in the 
judgment, the comparative report on the state of the law in the Contracting Parties and the 
relevant international law increases the legitimacy of the Court since it shows the 
stakeholders that the decision is well informed. 
Comparative data can positively affect another aspect of substantive legitimacy, namely 
requirement for the judgments to be realistic, executable, and beneficial for the Respondent 
State.31 Judge Jaeger points out that including comparative analysis in the judgments can be a 
good supporting tool for national governments who wish to implement these judgments.32 
The Court can underline the practices that are in compliance with the Convention and, 
therefore, make execution of the judgments more straightforward. In this case, comparative 
data should not necessarily form a compelling argument but can be a source of inspiration 
and information for the judges and the respondent parties. 
3. INFORMATIONAL PURPOSE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE CASE LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
3.1 PURPOSES OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE REASONING OF THE ECTHR 
As stated above, in the ECtHR a comparative analysis is conducted and a report on the results 
is drafted by the Research Division following a request from a Judge-Rapporteur. After a 
report is prepared there is a variety of possible ways in which the comparative data may 
affect the judgment of the Court. First, it may not appear in the final judgment at all. Judges 
Spielmann, Tulkens and Birsan explicitly mentioned this possibility.33 Second, comparative 
                                                          
31 Certain parallels can be drawn with the argument constructed by Slaughter in relation to the role of 
comparative law in the reasoning of national Court. She explained that ‘by pointing to the actions of fellow 
States, a national court can reassure itself (and its government) that it will not disadvantage the nation in dealing 
with other nations’. Slaughter, A-M., 'A Typology of Transnational Communication', University of Richmond 
Law Review, Vol. 29, 1994, pp. 99-137, at p. 116. 
 
32 ‘This information is not for the Court it is for the outside world. Many law journals only print extracts from 
the law part and not the facts. Within the facts you can find a lot – not only factual basis of the single case but 
also on the legal situation. And this is just a way to inform the States. We did not use it neither in your favour 
nor against you but perhaps in the context of this question you can inform yourself – that there is a European 
movement in some direction’. Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Renate Jaeger (European 
Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg 2010). 
 
33 Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Dean Spielmann (European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg 2010), Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Corneliu Bîrsan (European Court of 
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data may be mentioned in a separate part of a judgment, but is not mentioned in the Court’s 
reasoning or, where mentioned, it does not form part of a compelling argument. Third, the 
ECtHR may use the data in its reasoning as a persuasive argument.  
One can most vividly distinguish between these purposes by considering the part of the 
judgment where the comparative data is mentioned and the degree of direct influence the data 
has on the outcome of the case.34 If the comparative data appears to be explicitly 
acknowledged in the reasoning of the judgment and explicitly affects the outcome, one can 
conclude that it has served a persuasive purpose. If conclusions of comparative analysis are 
mentioned in the judgment but they have no explicitly acknowledged effect on the reasoning, 
or if comparative research was conducted but it is not even mentioned in the reasoning then 
the comparative data serves an informational purpose.35 
In a number of cases, the ECtHR used comparative data to decide about the presence or 
absence of European consensus or common European trends with respect to a particular legal 
issue. For instance, in Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey36 the ECtHR, in light of the laws accepted by the 
majority of the Contracting States, found a violation where Turkish legislation forbade 
married women from retaining their maiden names. Comparative data can be found in this 
judgment in the chapter dedicated to international law. At the same time, the reference to 
comparative analysis was made in the part of the judgment explaining the Court’s reasoning. 
While noting the width of the margin of appreciation the State can enjoy in this case, the 
Court stated: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights, Strasbourg 2010); Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Françoise Tulkens 
(European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg 2010). 
 
34 Unlike judgments of national courts from some common law countries judgments of the ECtHR are rigidly 
structured. Zupančič pointed out that each judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is ‘divided into 
three principal sections. The first one is entitled “The Facts,” the second one “The Law” whereas the so-called 
Operative Part at the end represents the implemental ruling of the Court’. Zupančič, B., The Owl of Minerva: 
Essays on Human Rights, Eleven International Publisher, Utrecht, 2008, p. 377. This makes the separation 
between informational and persuasive task less arbitrary as it is in relation to less structured judgments of 
national courts. 
 
35 Slaughter acknowledged a form of transjudicial communication which does not have persuasive effect but 
merely ‘provide[s] inspiration for the solution of a particular legal problem’. Slaughter, loc.cit note 31, 117  
Certain analogies can be drawn with informational purpose of comparative law. However, informational 
purpose of comparative law is not solely concerned with transjudicial communication; it can also include 
communication between the ECtHR and national parliaments through laws. 
 
36 ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 16 November 2004 (Appl.no. 48616/99). 
 
[T]he Court notes the emergence of a consensus among the Contracting States 
of the Council of Europe in favour of choosing the spouses’ family name on an 
equal footing. Of the member states of the Council of Europe Turkey is the 
only country which legally imposes – even where the couple prefers an 
alternative arrangement – the husband’s name as the couple’s surname and 
thus the automatic loss of the woman’s own surname on her marriage.37 
The comparative analysis in this and similar cases serves a persuasive purpose since the 
ECtHR supports its finding by referring to the laws accepted in the majority of the 
Contracting Parties. It appears unnecessary to go further into the detailed examination of this 
purpose, since, unlike the informational purpose, it has received a much greater degree of 
scholarly attention.38 
As regards the informational purpose of comparative law, the apparent limitation of this 
research is that comparative law reports prepared by the Registry of the ECtHR are 
confidential. Moreover, it is not publicly available whether such reports are prepared in a 
particular case or not. For that reason, it is not possible to claim definitively that there are 
cases where comparative analysis is done but is not mentioned in the text of the judgment at 
all. The plausible conclusion about availability of such cases can be drawn from information 
shared by the judges during the interviews with one of the authors. For example, Judge Šikuta 
maintains that comparative research is conducted in nearly all Grand Chamber cases,39 but 
the judgments in all these cases do not necessarily contain summaries of comparative 
research.  
In some cases, a comparative report is not referred to in the final judgment due to some 
limitations. Judge Tulkens points out:   
[I]n the Lautsi Chamber case – we had 17 countries with different situation 
from one country to another. But at the end of the day we decided not to use 
                                                          
37 Ibidem, para. 61. 
 
38 Helfer, L.R., 'Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights', Cornell International 
Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1993, pp. 133-166; Benvenisti, E., 'Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and 
Universal Standards', Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 31,No. 4, 1999, pp. 843 -854; Murray J.L., 
'Consensus: concordance, or hegemony of majority' in: Dialogues between Judges, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, 2008; Letsas, G., A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009; Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit note 9; Dzehtsiarou, K., 'European Consensus and the 
Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights ', German Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 10, 
2011, pp. 1730-1745. 
 
39 Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Ján Šikuta. 
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this comparative analysis in the Chamber judgment. And, indeed, how we can 
use it if there are only 17 out of 47. It is not representative enough.40 
Nevertheless, the judges had access to the report and it served an informational purpose. A 
more detailed comparative report was prepared for the Grand Chamber judgment in Lautsi 
and others v. Italy.41 
Frequently, the Court is quite willing to demonstrate its awareness of the national legal 
regulations of the Contracting Parties. For example, in K.U. v. Finland,42 the case concerning 
data protection on the Internet, the Court mentioned comparative data in the judgment but it 
does not appear in the reasoning of the judgment. In Nachova and others v. Bulgaria the 
Court quoted comparative data on European States specifically prosecuting ‘racial 
violence’.43 This data did not find its way to the Court’s reasoning. In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. 
Portugal the Court considered a dispute over the registration of a trademark, however after 
describing  how trademarks are registered in the Contracting Parties omitted the comparative 
data in its reasoning. In Burden v. the United Kingdom,44 the Court chose a different 
approach by clearly stating that comparison is not relevant and avoiding it as a compelling 
argument. While in Perdigão v. Portugal45 and Depalle v. France46 the comparative law 
section was included in the judgment but only got passing mention in the reasoning. 
While this outline of the Court’s case law is far from being exhaustive, it suggests that 
comparative analysis is used for informational purposes in cases concerning a wide array of 
rights, rather than in any particular set of them. Furthermore, the use of comparative law for 
                                                          
40 Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Françoise Tulkens. 
 
41 Lautsi and others v. Italy, supra note 5, para. 70. 
 
42 ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland, 2 December 2008 (Appl.no. 2872/02). 
 
43 ECtHR, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, 6 July 2005 (Appl.no. 43577/98 and 43579/98), at para. 82. 
 
44 ECtHR, Burden v. United Kingdom, 29 April 2008 (Appl.no. 13378/05). 
 
45 ECtHR, Perdigão v. Portugal, 16 November 2010 (Appl.no. 24768/06), at para. 47-50  In this case the Court 
concluded that if the compensation for expropriation is fully absorbed by the amount payable to the State in 
court fees such arrangement violates Article 1 of Protocol 1. Comparative data was briefly mentioned in the 
Court’s reasoning, but it was not used for persuasive purposes and was simply deployed to confirm that the 
obligation to pay fees is of fiscal nature. Ibidem, para. 61. 
 
46 In Depalle v. France the Court considered if the French authorities violated the Convention by refusing to 
authorise the applicant to continue living in the house on the coastal land. This case is discussed in more details 
below. 
 
informational purposes is not a mere coincidence but a deliberate choice of the Court. 
Comparative data is called upon to show that the ECtHR is aware of the European legal 
context of the matter at issue.47 Representation of this data can arguably increase the 
confidence of the stakeholders in the judgments of the Court as being informed and can, 
therefore, increase the substantive legitimacy of the Court’s judgments. 
3.2 USE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSE IN THE CASE LAW OF THE 
ECTHR 
The report of the Research Division containing comparative data can be used for 
informational purposes in two ways: 1) quoted, but not mentioned in the final judgment; or 2) 
mentioned in the reasoning of the Court, but still be treated as informational only.48 These 
two options are now examined in turn. 
3.2.1 Abandoned Comparative Data? 
There are cases where the ECtHR quotes the summary of the comparative research but makes 
no inferences in its reasoning based on comparative law. In K.U. v Finland49 an unknown 
person disclosed personal information of a 12-year-old applicant on a dating website. The 
service provider, however, refused to divulge the identity of the holder of the IP address in 
question, regarding itself bound by the confidentiality of telecommunications, as defined by 
law. The applicant complained to the ECtHR that Finland failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 8 of the Convention. The ECtHR cited comparative data in the judgment in very 
general terms: 
A comparative review of national legislation of the member States of the 
Council of Europe shows that in most countries there is a specific obligation 
on the part of telecommunications service providers to submit computer data, 
including subscriber information, in response to a request by the investigating 
or judicial authorities, regardless of the nature of a crime.50 
                                                          
47 Judge Tulkens pointed out that comparative law can be cited for informational purpose: ‘just to feel the 
context of what is going on in Europe’. Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Françoise Tulkens. 
 
48 While it might be desirable to provide definite proof of the comparative data being used, but not reproduced 
in the final text of a judgment, such attempt is virtually impossible due to the simple fact that the data is not 
mentioned. However, one may rely on the statements of the Judges presented above. 
 
49 K.U. v. Finland, supra note 42. 
 
50 Ibidem, para. 32. 
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This information was not referred to in the reasoning of the judgment. Despite the fact that 
the ECtHR mentioned the margin of appreciation of the Contracting Party51 and ‘converging 
standards’ as limits for the margin of appreciation,52 the analysis was articulated in general 
terms and was not grounded in the comparative research outlined in the judgment. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the width of the margin of appreciation is often determined by the 
degree of convergence of legal standards in Europe: broader acceptance of a particular 
standard narrows down the margin of appreciation.53 The ECtHR instead used the principle 
of effectiveness of rights to decide the case.54  
While not being dispositive in K.U. v. Finland, comparative analysis was implicitly used to 
support the findings of the ECtHR made by other means of interpretation. The comparative 
analysis mentioned by the Court supports the finding of a violation in this case. Mahoney 
argues that ‘[t]he comparative method in the ECHR system serves as an evidentiary 
accompaniment or supporting factor for other interpretative considerations that point to a 
given meaning’.55 In other words, comparative law materials support findings that were 
reached by other means of interpretation by providing the general framework of legal 
regulation in Europe. 
In the Grand Chamber judgment Depalle v. France,56 the Court dealt with the planning of a 
coastal area. The applicant complained that Article 1 of Protocol 1 was violated as a result of 
the French authorities’ refusal to authorise the applicant to continue occupying a house built 
on maritime public land. The judgment contains a summary of a comparative research: 
The Court examined the situation in sixteen coastal member States. Only four 
States (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Kingdom and Sweden) do 
not recognise the existence of maritime public property exclusive of any 
                                                          
51 Ibidem, para. 43. 
 
52 Ibidem, para. 44. 
 
53 See, for example, ECtHR, Evans v. the United Kingdom, 10 April 2007 (Appl.no. 6339/05), at para. 77. 
 
54 K.U. v. Finland, supra note 42, para. 49. 
 
55 Mahoney, P., 'The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: Reference 
Back to National Law' in: Canivet, G., Andenas, M. and Fairgrieve, D. (eds), Comparative Law Before the 
Courts, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2004, p. 146. 
 
56 ECtHR, Depalle v. France, 29 March 2010 (Appl.no. 34044/02). 
 
private ownership rights. In the other twelve States (Germany, Croatia, Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Slovenia 
and Turkey), maritime public property belongs either to the State or to other 
public bodies and is inalienable on that basis.57 
The Court further described certain particularities of legal regulation in Croatia, Spain and 
Turkey,58 and the relevant texts adopted by the organs of the Council of Europe.59 The Court 
made two references to the state of the law in European countries in its reasoning. The Court 
also made a reference to the Council of Europe texts while arguing that the measures in 
question ‘pursued a legitimate aim that was in the general interest: to promote unrestricted 
access to the shore, the importance of which is clearly established’.60 Finally, the ECtHR 
mentioned common European law in its conclusion that it is necessary to adopt a firmer 
policy regarding the protection of the maritime zone. The ECtHR stated: 
The refusal to renew authorisation of occupancy and the measure ordering the 
applicant to restore the site to its condition prior to the construction of the 
house correspond to a concern to apply the law consistently and more strictly, 
having regard to the increasing need to protect coastal areas and their use by 
the public, but also to ensure compliance with planning regulations. Having 
regard to the appeal of the coast and the degree to which it is coveted, the need 
for planning control and unrestricted public access to the coast makes it 
necessary to adopt a firmer policy of management of this part of the country. 
The same is true of all European coastal areas.61 
No more reference was made to comparative law in the reasoning of the judgment and 
no violation of Article 1 of the Protocol 1 was found in this case. It seems safe to 
suggest that the ECtHR did not use comparative data here as a compelling argument. 
No consensus could be identified from the comparison and therefore it does not seem 
that comparative analysis is included in the judgment for the purpose of persuasion. 
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58 Ibidem, para. 53. 
 
59 Ibidem, para. 54. 
 
60 Ibidem, para. 81. 
 
61 Ibidem, para. 54. 
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Moreover, a lack of consensus or common practice was also not explicitly 
acknowledged by the Court. 
3.2.2 Irrelevant Comparative Law? 
There are cases where the ECtHR quotes comparative analysis and refers to it in its reasoning 
but states that it is not relevant to the matter at issue. In Burden v. the United Kingdom,62  the 
issue was whether cohabiting sisters can be treated equally with married couples and same 
sex partners in civil partnership for the purposes of inheritance tax. A husband inheriting 
from a wife or a wife inheriting from a husband is exempt from the inheritance tax in the 
United Kingdom. The same applies to a partner of the same sex partnership inheriting from 
another partner. However, the cohabiting siblings would have to pay the inheritance tax. 
Chapter 3 entitled ‘Relevant comparative law and material’ was included in the judgement. 
This chapter contained comparative analysis of the domestic legislations of some of the 
Contracting Parties regarding the issue, although the ECtHR did not identify any commonly 
accepted standard in the area.63 
The ECtHR acknowledged that the legislation in respect to inheritance taxes is diverse in 
Europe and it confirmed that some Contracting Parties might allow inheritance tax exemption 
for siblings. Nevertheless, it stated that the legal issue in this case concerned the legal 
difference between married couples and cohabiting siblings rather than taxation policy in the 
Member States: 
Just as there can be no analogy between married and Civil Partnership Act 
couples, on one hand, and heterosexual or homosexual couples who choose to 
live together but not to become husband and wife or civil partners, on the other 
hand, the absence of such a legally binding agreement between the applicants 
renders their relationship of co-habitation, despite its long duration, 
fundamentally different to that of a married or civil partnership couple. This 
view is unaffected by the fact that [...] Member States have adopted a variety 
of different rules of succession as between survivors of a marriage, civil 
partnership and those in a close family relationship and have similarly adopted 
                                                          
62 Burden v. United Kingdom, supra note 44. 
 
63 Ibidem, para. 26. 
 
different policies as regards the grant of inheritance tax exemptions to the 
various categories of survivor; States, in principle, remaining free to devise 
different rules in the field of taxation policy.64 
The fact that there is no consensus in Europe regarding the matter at issue did not play a 
decisive role in finding no violation by the Contracting Party. The ECtHR stated that there is 
a more fundamental difference between cohabiting sisters and married couples which cannot 
be rebutted by an agreement among the Contracting Parties, and even more so when no such 
agreement exists. The ECtHR underlined the fact that the legislation of the Contracting 
Parties might change but this will not change the legal character of the matter. For that 
reason, the comparative data in this case served only an informational purpose and did not 
affect the final judgment directly. 
3.3 INFORMED DECISION-MAKING AND REFERENCES TO FOREIGN LAWS IN NATIONAL COURTS 
The use of comparative law for informational purposes by the ECtHR is similar to the use of 
foreign laws by domestic superior and constitutional courts and therefore legitimacy issues of 
deployment of foreign laws in domestic tribunals are often relevant for the ECtHR. 
McCrudden argues that ‘[t]he phenomenon of borrowing and transplantation from the 
international to national, from the national to international, from national jurisdiction to 
national jurisdiction is now commonplace’.65 This interaction is sometimes called ‘cross-
fertilisation among legal systems’.66 However, legitimacy of citing foreign laws in 
constitutional adjudication is a subject of keen debate with options ranging from total 
                                                          
64 Ibidem, para. 65. 
 
65 McCrudden, C., 'A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional 
Rights',Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2000, pp. 499-532, at p. 501. 
 
66 Slaughter, loc.cit. note 31, p. 99. 
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rejection of the foreign sources as irrelevant67 to welcoming them as legitimate legal 
sources.68  
It is arguable that national tribunals also use comparative law for informational purposes69 
and this shows that the informational comparative law approach is, at a very minimum, not an 
isolated method used exclusively by the ECtHR. Cram examined references to foreign cases 
in the reasoning of the UK House of Lords and the Court of Appeal and concluded:  
Most foreign cases cited in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal lie 
somewhere between the “supportive” and “minor influence” points of the 
spectrum employed in this study. However, there are instances where a foreign 
authority has been treated as a persuasive authority.70 
Since comparative law used by the ECtHR also can be deployed for persuasive and 
informational purposes the following points from the studies of domestic legal systems are 
relevant to the ECtHR. 
3.3.1 The Sources Should be Acknowledged 
                                                          
67 See, Alford, R.P., 'Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution', American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2004, pp. 57-69, at p. 58. Saunders summarised the arguments commonly 
used by the opponents of comparative law: ‘the opposition is based upon one or both of the following grounds. 
The first concerns the legitimacy of the use of foreign precedent in constitutional adjudication at all. This is the 
ground on which Justice Scalia objected to the reference to German federal practice in Printz, when he wrote 
that comparative analysis is ‘inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite 
relevant to the task of writing one’. The second ground of opposition is the potential for abuse or, less 
pejoratively, misuse, of foreign law, in terms of either judicial or comparative method. Saunders C., 'The Use 
and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law', Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 
37-76, at p. 41. 
 
68 Judge La Forest of the Canadian Supreme Court points out that ‘[t]he greater use of foreign material affords 
another source, another tool for the construction of better judgments… The greater use of foreign materials by 
courts and counsel in all countries can, I think, only enhance their effectiveness and sophistication’. La Forest, 
G.v. 'The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts', Maine Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 211-220, at 
p. 216. See also, Markesinis, B and Fedtke, J, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, 
2005, pp. 11-67; Kentridge, S, ‘Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication: The South African 
Experience’, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 245-256. 
 
69 Slaughter argued that ‘taking account of the position of fellow national courts in accepting the obligations of a 
common treaty may simply be an instance of taking advantage of a quick source of information about the degree 
of reciprocal acceptance of these obligations...’ Slaughter, loc.cit. note 31, p. 101. 
 
70 Cram, I., 'Resort to Foreign Constitutional Norms in Domestic Human Rights Jurisprudence with Reference to 
Terrorism Cases', Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2009, pp. 118-141, at p. 140.  
 
Slaughter argues that in the majority of cases where national courts deploy foreign cases as a 
source of inspiration they do not explicitly acknowledge the sources.71 The judges of the 
ECtHR confirmed that this situation is also possible in the context of the ECtHR72 and this 
can partially explain why in some cases comparative law is not cited by the ECtHR in its 
judgments. However, it is argued that acknowledgment of the sources can increase legitimacy 
of the judgment. Slaughter, for example, observes:   
[F]or courts […] committed to the need to persuade73 as well as to coerce their 
audience of litigants, lawyers, and citizens in any particular case – the 
persuasiveness of any one particular decision may be enhanced by a simple 
demonstration that others have trodden a similar path.74 
Therefore, if the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments is to be strengthened, the Court should 
clearly establish its sources. Even if such sources are used for information only. 
 
3.3.2 Broader Effect of Well-Informed Judgments. 
Flanagan and Ahern conducted a survey study of 43 judges from the British House of Lords, 
the Caribbean Court of Justice, the High Court of Australia, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, and the Supreme Courts of Ireland, India, Israel, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States.75 One of the findings they acquired is relevant for the use of comparative law 
for informational purposes in the ECtHR’s judgments. Flanagan and Ahern established a link 
between deployment of foreign sources and the concern of the judges for their judgments to 
be internationally recognised. They pointed out:  
The hypothesis [transnational judicial acceptance] is also consistent with the 
large proportion of judges for whom foreign judges form part of their 
judgment audience (47 percent), and the fact that half of those judges noted 
their responsiveness to their audience’s attitude towards the use of 
comparative material.76 
                                                          
71 Slaughter, loc.cit. note 31, p. 118. 
 
72 Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Françoise Tulkens. 
 
73 As it is mentioned above the ECtHR should put more focus on persuasion that the national courts since the 
Convention execution machinery is much less capable of coercion. 
 
74 Slaughter, loc.cit. note 31, p. 119. 
 
75 Flanagan, B. and Ahern, S., 'Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey of Common Law 
Supreme Court Judges', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-28. 
 
76 Ibidem, p. 19. 
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National judges appear concerned with the transnational acceptance of their judgments. This 
concern is even more appropriate in the context of the ECtHR since the embeddedness of the 
ECtHR’s rules through the medium of the national judiciary ensures effectiveness of the 
Court’s mechanism.77 If national judges quote foreign sources to bolster transnational judicial 
acceptance of their judgments, it is suggested that the national judges would more readily 
accept judgments of the ECtHR if their domestic legal rules were mentioned in the ECtHR 
judgments.  
 
3.4 JUDGES ABOUT INFORMATIONAL PURPOSE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
The judges of the Court acknowledged the informational function of comparative analysis 
during the interviews conducted in 2008-2010. Thirteen judges of the ECtHR representing 
different legal systems were interviewed. It is worth mentioning that even those judges who 
were critical about comparative law as a source of the Court’s reasoning were much more 
positive with respect to the informational function of comparative research. Judge Zupančič, 
for instance, while seeing little relevance in comparative analysis and European consensus as 
a persuasive source, mentioned that comparative analysis can give a general impression about 
the way European law ‘tends to go’.78 
Judge Kovler pointed out that the comparative research helps judges to see the problem in the 
case from other angles.79 Deputy Registrar of the Court Michael O’Boyle also underlined that 
it is a natural process for a lawyer to want to know what the law in other countries is.80  
The judges cannot be experts in all areas and branches of law with which they deal, and 
comparative law gives them a broader spectrum of possible solutions to a particular legal 
problem. Judge Rozakis emphasised: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
77 Helfer, L.R., 'Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
2008, pp. 125-159. 
 
78 Dzehtsiarou, K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Bostjan Zupančič (European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg 2010). For more see, Dzehtsiarou, loc.cit. note 38. 
 
79 Dzehtsiarou K., Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Anatoly Kovler (European Court of Human Rights, 
Strasbourg 2009). 
 
80  
Dzehtsiarou K., Interview with Michael O'Boyle (European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg 2009). 
 
[T]he fact remains that law extraneous to the Court’s own case law has gained 
ground, and is increasingly gaining ground, in the ECHR's mode of operating 
before it reaches a decision. This is a good sign for the founders of a court of 
law protecting values which by their nature are inherently indivisible and 
global.81 
While disagreeing on the weight that the ECtHR should attach to comparative data the judges 
seem to see comparative law as a valuable source of information that can give them an 
impression about the general legal framework in Europe and provide information about other 
possible solutions in similar circumstances. 
To sum up the ECtHR is willing to use comparative analysis in its decision-making process. 
Not only does such a tendency coincide with the current views and trends in legal scholarship 
and practice, but it proves to be highly useful for the Court itself, allowing it to see a bigger 
picture of the European context, and supplying an array of possible solutions. Whether the 
judges in a specific case decide to reproduce, or not, the findings of the comparative analysis 
there is no doubt that comparative law is indeed used both for persuasive and informational 
purposes.  
However, it is clear that for the ECtHR the use of comparative law in decision-making is far 
from being conceptually and methodologically settled; even less so when it is used for 
informational purpose only. The Court faces a complex task of transparently delineating the 
cases in which comparative law merits mentioning in the reasoning and where it does not.  
Both the academic sources and practice demonstrate the legitimising potential of the decision 
informed by the foreign and comparative experience, but at the same time the broader use of 
these sources would necessitate significant changes to the existing approaches. The foreign 
sources need to be openly acknowledged and the comparative law analysis should not be left 
outside the text if the substantive legitimisation is to be achieved. 
The use of comparative law for informational purpose is a novel technique in the “arsenal” of 
the ECtHR, providing the intellectual richness and flexibility of argumentation; however, it 
needs to be properly applied to ensure a positive effect. The rather welcoming attitude of the 
judges and the Registry to comparative sources suggests that such accommodation will 
unlikely encounter excessive obstacles. 
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4. PARTICULAR ISSUES OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
If comparative data is collected for informational purposes this data should be adequate and 
reflect the current regulation of a particular legal issue in the laws of the Contracting Parties. 
Otherwise, misrepresentation can distort the legal basis of the findings and compromise the 
position of the Court as a competent and independent arbiter in human rights disputes 
because inadequate and misleading comparative information can reduce substantive 
legitimacy of the judgments. If national judges and lawyers find out that their national law 
was presented inadequately, they will become dissatisfied with the judgment and their 
dissatisfaction can damage the legitimacy of the judgment.82 
When a Judge-Rappoteur requests a comparative analysis he is not in a position to predict for 
what purpose the report completed by the Research Division will ultimately serve. Therefore, 
from the outset, comparative law research should be designed in a manner that permits both 
persuasive and informational use. It is inevitable that only a small part of the comparative 
research will be reproduced in the final judgment of the Court, and, thus, it seems logical that 
if the Court is using comparative data for informational purposes the results of the analysis 
may be presented in more general terms. In cases where the comparative research is used for 
persuasive purposes, it is desirable for the ECtHR to present a more detailed account of the 
research. 
4.1 ‘CHERRY-PICKING’ CHALLENGE 
The so-called ‘cherry-picking’ challenge is one of the most common points of criticism of 
any comparative analysis regardless of its scope and potential use.83 Indeed, in the world of 
comparison the choice of comparators appears to be dominant and crucial. However, it is 
important to distinguish between considerations of what jurisdictions to compare and 
                                                          
82 See, Çalı B., 'Balancing Human Rights? Methodological Problems with Weights, Scales and Proportions', 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2007, pp. 251-270. 
 
83 de Cruz, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, Cavendish, London, 1999, p. 219. ‘[A]ll the Court has 
done today, to borrow from another context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends’. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia J., dissenting) The ‘cherry-picking problem’ is not 
confined to judicial case selection. It is also typical for academic comparative law. Hirschl pointed out that ‘too 
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building well. Hirschl, R, 'The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law', American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2005, pp. 125-155, at p. 154. 
 
considerations of representative selection and the need to avoid bias. These latter 
considerations might not be fully pertinent to every single representation of a full-scale 
comparative endeavour. 
This section does not aim to contribute to the general academic debate on the issue of proper 
comparators in constitutional adjudication. In the majority of cases the Court tends to explore 
the laws of all 47 Contracting Parties.84 However, it is argued here that the ECtHR should be 
extra careful in the selection and representation of laws in the final judgment because 
inadequate representation may reduce the legitimising potential of comparative law. The 
manner in which the results of a comparative analysis conducted by the ECtHR are 
represented in the text of a judgment should be determined by the purpose of comparison and 
it is possible to argue that informational and persuasive purposes lay down diverging sets of 
rules for proper selection of jurisdictions to be mentioned.  
The persuasive use of comparative analysis is essentially linked to establishing the presence 
or absence of a European consensus about a legal issue.85 Consequently, any such attempt to 
persuade will largely depend on the ability of the Court to show that a conclusion as to a 
consensus has a reliable empirical basis. The persuasive use of comparative analysis demands 
a choice of jurisdictions that is representative and free of bias. 
Informational purposes of comparative analysis in ECtHR case law allows for a less rigid set 
of rules for choosing comparators. The desired effect of an analysis aimed to inform the 
Court, Contracting Parties and the public is achieved by showing an array of existing and 
possible solutions to a problem, rather than by persuading that a certain solution is the most 
plausible. However it is not suggested here that information used should not be carefully 
verified but that its representation in the judgment can be reduced to a necessary minimum. 
It seems that frivolous cherry-picking would undermine the validity of an analysis, but 
picking up illustrative solutions appears to be justified in satisfying the informational 
purpose. The informational purpose does not necessarily call for a selection to be 
representative, because on some occasions the ECtHR might wish to highlight 
unconventional and/or extreme approaches. Moreover, selective representation of 
comparative analysis is arguably inevitable considering the fact that the ECtHR is constrained 
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by the need to be reasonable in expanding the length of a judgment and, thus, unable to 
outline the minutiae of the Registry’s report. 
4.2 CHOOSING PROPER COMPARATORS: REASONS VERSUS OUTCOMES. 
Comparative analysis conducted by the ECtHR is not aimed at explaining the differences and 
commonalities between different legal systems which is very often the case with respect to 
academic comparative research. de Cruz points out:  
A systematic comparison which is the essence of comparative law, seeks to 
explain the similarities and divergences between the legal systems selected for 
comparison. The reasons for these differences and similarities are very often 
extra-legal and cannot be causally linked to any legal rule or principle.86 
Occasionally, the ECtHR’s comparative analysis focuses on descriptive rather than analytical 
aspects. The Research Division provides a description of the ways a particular legal matter is 
regulated in the Contracting Parties and does not explain the similarities and differences in-
depth. In Layla Sahin v. Turkey, the ECtHR included the results of the comparative law 
research in the judgment without making any major attempts to carry out detailed analysis of 
the reasons behind them because the ECtHR appeared to be more interested in the outcomes 
themselves.87 
Significantly, it was mentioned by Judge Spielmann that in an ideal situation the reasons for 
adopting a particular solution by the States could assist the Court in coming to the most 
adequate and appropriate decision. In particular, the inquest into the reasons behind the 
absence of relevant legislation in a particular field could be enlightening in appraising the 
reasons for a lack of consensus in certain domains.88 However, research revealing all of the 
complicated sets of political negotiations bringing a particular solution into a national legal 
system can only be conducted if an in-depth analysis is carried out. This would need to take 
into consideration the legislative history of a particular bill, lobbying and stakeholders’ 
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behaviour, legislative traditions, media coverage, social stereotypes, convictions of the 
members of parliament, and multiple other factors.89 
Yet, it seems implausible to be fully convinced that the true and precise reasons were 
discerned and that no factor was omitted or misinterpreted. Furthermore, one has to keep in 
mind that after all the research and analysis has been carried out, the Court will inevitably 
face the question of whether these reasons still matter for interpretation. The best illustration 
of the complexity of such endeavours is the infamous originalism debate concerning the 
interpretation of the US Constitution.90  
While it may be impossible to set out clearly the reasons which led a specific national 
jurisdiction to adopt a certain solution to a legal problem, comparative analysis does not need 
to avoid these attempts altogether. Various hints as to the underlying reasons might be 
obtained by deducing the inner logic of a particular legal solution. Arguably, the basic 
methodological principle of comparative law – functionality – is in itself aimed at the same 
goal.91 
Functionality, as the basic methodological principle, is common to virtually all existing 
methodologies of comparative analysis. One may compare objects which are incomparable in 
principle; however, the output of such comparison is not likely to surpass a plain recognition 
of divergence. Comparative analysis should be based on an examination of functional 
equivalents aimed at analogous outcomes in the jurisdictions to be compared. A choice of 
these equivalents should not be limited to discerning black letter law constructs alone, but 
should include relevant political and social considerations as well as enforcement practice. As 
Lando points out: 
Another phenomenon should also be noticed. A rule of law found in most 
countries may not exist at all in a certain country. In such cases social norms 
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of a kind different from law may have done what in other countries the rule of 
law aims at doing. These norms may be compared to the Chinese rites or the 
Japanese "giri." The English law of contract offers a well-known example. In 
many Continental countries an offer is binding on the offer or unless the 
contrary has been stated in the offer. In England an offer is revocable until it 
has been accepted. In English business circles however, it is very often 
considered unfair to revoke an offer, and so it is not done.92 
Functional equivalents and specific outcomes are both preceded and predetermined by the 
underlying reasons which led to the adoption of a specific legal scheme. A serviceably good 
understanding of these reasons can be deduced through the reconstruction of the inner logic 
of functional equivalents. Basically, the analysis should follow the reverse path – from 
outcomes to reasons. However, it is crucial to keep the scrutiny focused on functionality 
itself. A profound understanding of a legal problem can be achieved through the appreciation 
of the legal means employed, their place in a legal system, the social, political, and cultural 
environment. All of these elements combined reveal the inner logic of a functional 
equivalent, and it might well be anticipated that this logic will expose the reasons for the 
adoption of a certain approach. 
4.3 WHO SHOULD DO THE COMPARISON? 
4.3.1 Comparative Analysis Conducted by the Court 
A summary of the research report produced upon a request of a Judge-Rapporteur is often 
included in the judgment and entitled ‘law in Contracting States’,93 ‘comparative and 
international law’94 or ‘relevant comparative law and material’.95 By means of an example, in 
the recent A., B., and C. v. Ireland case the ECtHR stated: 
Abortion is available on request (according to certain criteria including 
gestational limits) in some 30 Contracting States. An abortion justified on 
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health grounds is available in some 40 Contracting States and justified on 
well-being grounds in some 35 such States. Three Contracting States 
prohibit abortion in all circumstances (Andorra, Malta and San Marino). 
In recent years, certain States have extended the grounds on which 
abortion can be obtained (Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal and Spain).96 
Based on these findings, the ECtHR stated that ‘contrary to the Government’s submission, 
the Court considers that there is indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the 
Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on broader grounds 
than accorded under Irish law’.97  
Likewise, the Court also quotes comparative data to support its finding concerning an 
absence of European consensus. The Court provides examples of a variety of possible 
solutions to the matter at issue. In Murphy v. Ireland, the Court examined the law prohibiting 
religious advertisements in mass media. The Court stated:  
[T]here appears to be no clear consensus between the Contracting States 
as to the manner in which to legislate for the broadcasting of religious 
advertisements. Certain States have similar prohibitions (for example, 
Greece, Switzerland and Portugal), certain prohibit religious 
advertisements considered offensive (for example, Spain and see also 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC) and certain have no legislative restriction 
(the Netherlands). There appears to be no ‘uniform conception of the 
requirements of the protection of the rights of others’ in the context of the 
legislative regulation of the broadcasting of religious advertising.98 
The Court is not in a position to quote in full a comparative report prepared by the Research 
Division.99 However, even a short quote such as the one outlined above shows that the Court 
is making an informed decision.  
It should be noted that the Court’s engagement in comparative research is not free from 
potential and searching criticism. First, the lawyers and the judges of the ECtHR cannot 
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specialise in all of the particular legal areas under review. As such, there may be 
circumstances when this absence of specific expert knowledge might lead the lawyers to form 
an account of the national law based predominantly on the black-letter law. At the same time, 
black-letter law and applicable law can be considerably different. 
The application of particular laws and recent developments in case law can also have a 
significant impact on the regulation of a particular legal issue. Judge Tulkens framed this 
challenge as follows: ‘we ask the lawyer to see in the literature what the position of national 
law is. However, it is very hard for the lawyer to be aware of all the recent developments’.100 
Therefore, the Court’s practice of considering third parties’ submissions and other sources of 
information should be welcomed as they collectively can provide a multifaceted description 
of a given legal issue.101 
Second, due to the heavy workload of the ‘filtering’ lawyers102 and the judges of the Court 
(the Court’s backlog in 2010 was roughly 139,650 pending applications),103 it is extremely 
burdensome for the lawyers to engage in lengthy and detailed research on a particular legal 
topic. That said, the Court’s engagement in comparative research makes it possible for the 
Court to base its decision on more reliable data.  
Comparative analysis is complicated and time consuming.104 Çalı, Koch, and Bruch point out 
that the reasonable length of proceedings in the ECtHR is considered by the stakeholders as 
an important legitimising factor.105 However, comparative analysis will not seriously affect 
the length of proceeding since it is only deployed in the complex cases, while the reason for 
the lengthy procedure in the ECtHR is an overwhelming amount of repetitive cases.106 
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Moreover, comparative research is typically requested when a case is relinquished by the 
Chamber and accepted by the Grand Chamber of the Court,107 which deals with no more than 
several dozen cases.108  
4.3.2 Comparative Research Conducted by Third Parties  
Occasionally, the Court summarises comparative analysis provided by third parties and 
deploys it in its reasoning.109 Most of the judges interviewed indicated a positive appreciation 
of third parties’ reports. Judge Spielmann, for example, points out that ‘[w]e rely more on our 
Research Division but if what the Research Division report provides is confirmed by NGOs 
then it is very important’.110 Various sources of information can mitigate the possible 
limitations of the research conducted by the Court, as outlined in the previous section. 
The Court has used external expertise in deciding a number of cases; these include third party 
interventions from NGOs,111 universities112 and non-respondent governments.113 The Court is 
prepared to use the externally arranged comparative surveys; however, this is not the 
preferred current approach, which tends to be based on research conducted by the staff of the 
Court.114 
Sometimes, the Court deploys comparative analysis from amicus curiae briefs prepared by 
NGOs. In Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, the Court considered if a failure by 
the authorities to amend birth certificates after gender reassignment surgery amounted to a 
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violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The ECtHR summarised the amicus curiae brief in 
the judgment115 and relied on it in its reasoning.116 
The judges interviewed for this study attached different values to the amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by NGOs. Most of them pointed out that such amicus curiae briefs reflect the 
biases of the NGOs that draft them.117 Judge Jaeger was of the opinion that quoting an 
NGO’s amicus curiae brief ‘is nothing more than a matter of politeness. The Court tries to 
strengthen human rights NGOs in their role and, therefore, it acknowledges their reports in 
the judgments. However, the main role of NGOs is on the implementation stage’.118 It should 
be noted that the opinion of Judge Jaeger is not shared by many of the judges interviewed. 
The practice of NGOs’ involvement in the activities of international organisations is quite 
common.119 An advantage of NGOs is that they focus on a particular legal issue and can be 
considered experts in the area of their activity. Furthermore, they are not subordinate to the 
Contracting Parties and for that reason they can independently assess national laws and 
practice.120 That said, NGOs are agenda-driven and, therefore, their assessment can be 
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affected by the aim they are striving to achieve.121 Moreover, some NGOs may operate only 
within one jurisdiction and lack sufficient awareness of foreign legal systems, which can lead 
to inadequate conclusions. 
Alternatively, the ECtHR might request comparative analysis from universities. The Court 
has not used this theoretically available possibility so far; while on few occasions the Court 
has accepted third-party interventions from the universities.122 Some of the advantages of this 
method of conducting comparative research are experience, independence, methodological 
adequacy, consistency, and flexibility.123 However, considering the specific nature of the 
requests from the ECtHR, a university or any other research institution will have to put in 
place a rigid supervision and control mechanism, which might not be too welcome in an 
institution based on free and unrestrained discussion. Moreover, a university willing to handle 
research requests from the ECtHR could face a complicated balancing task, where it would 
have to weigh the amount of scarce academic resources to be invested against potential 
reputational risks (if research does not live up to the highest standards). 
Finally, one potential source of comparative information is a Court’s ability to request about 
the state of the law in a particular Contracting Party from the national authorities of the 
Contracting Party itself. Later, this research could be incorporated in the report on a particular 
legal matter prepared by the Research Division of the ECtHR. The mechanics of such a 
scheme would be fundamentally different from the ready-made comparative law reports 
submitted by NGOs or universities. The authorities of the Contracting Parties would, instead, 
be asked to present an updated account of the regulation of a specific question in a respective 
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jurisdiction. Within such a scheme, it is still the ECtHR which would be responsible for the 
comparison and, thus, the risk of undue influence on the Court is mitigated. 
An obstacle to this mechanism of collecting comparative data is the absence of a clear legal 
basis in the Convention for such requests, which were not foreseen by the drafters of the 
Convention. A potential solution can be found in Article 38 of the Convention, which places 
a duty on the Contracting Parties concerned to furnish all necessary facilities for the Court to 
conduct an investigation. Also, other Contracting Parties may have to provide reports on the 
state of their national law in respect to a particular legal matter. Rule 44A1 of the Rules of 
Court provides: 
The parties have a duty to cooperate fully in the conduct of the 
proceedings and, in particular, to take such action within their power as 
the Court considers necessary for the proper administration of justice. 
This duty shall also apply to a Contracting Party not party to the 
proceedings where such cooperation is necessary.124 
Among the advantages of this way of doing comparative research is that the authorities 
carrying out the research in the Contracting Party is very well aware of the state of the 
national law in respect of a particular legal issue.  
As it has been demonstrated above, any comparative endeavour of the ECtHR should 
necessarily comply with the high standards of methodological rigour, consistency, and 
expertise. In order for the comparative analysis to achieve its intended effect it must not only 
demonstrate awareness of the diversity of approaches across jurisdictions but be supported by 
adequate analytical apparatus. A legitimising effect is ultimately only achieved when the 
stakeholders are convinced both of the decision-makers’ knowledge and their ability to 
process and employ it. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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The ECtHR often deploys dynamic interpretation of the ECHR. Thus, its openness to the use 
of comparative data is unsurprising. Indeed, considering the Court’s duty to pronounce 
judgments applicable in 47 national jurisdictions, its recourse to comparison is arguably 
inevitable. Awareness of the Contracting Parties’ respective legal positions allows the judges 
to make an informed decision. This bolsters the substantive legitimacy of ECtHR judgments. 
As may be observed in the case-law, the ECtHR does not limit itself to one mode of using 
comparative data, namely, persuasion, but sets the European legal background, elaborates on 
the possible approaches to an issue, and self-reflects, for example by using the data for the 
informational purpose. All this falls neatly within modern trends of comparative law 
scholarship. National courts are engaged in a similar endeavour to the extent that they are 
concerned about their judgments’ international recognition.  
The generous support for comparative endeavors by the judges of the ECtHR generates a 
positive environment for the use of comparative data for informational purposes. A number 
of techniques have been elaborated by the ECtHR to achieve the desired goal of informing 
itself and/or the public of the positions of the Contracting Parties on the relevant legal issue. 
Two of these techniques are most visible: 1) re-producing parts of the comparative law 
reports in a special section of the final judgment without mentioning them in the reasoning; 
and 2) re-producing parts of these reports in a special section, while rendering such data 
irrelevant for certain specified reasons.  
At the same time, the ECtHR faces a number of challenges if it decides to use the 
comparative law reports on a systematic basis. To prevent accusations of “cherry-picking” it 
should convincingly demonstrate the correspondence between the jurisdictions chosen and 
the aim pursued. The methodology of comparative analysis should be adequately followed 
and preference should be given to understanding the inner logic and mechanics of a particular 
solution rather than meticulous examination of the black letter law norms. 
Profound comparative analysis is likely to demand significant resources from the Court, 
which is already strained by an enormous backlog. Outsourcing the burden of comparison to 
some third-party, such as an NGO, university, or the national authorities, might appear to be 
among the possible solutions. However, the ECtHR will have to weigh the potential benefits 
of knowledge, focus and cost-savings, against the risks of bias and damage to perceptions of 
its status as an impartial adjudicator. In any event, a well-designed and thorough system of 
quality control would have to be put in place and the necessary reforms pursued. 
